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Abstract 
The objective of this paper is to investigate exit behaviour of small firms, using data from The 
Survey on the Retirement of Small Firm Managers, which provides detailed information on exit 
and post-exit behaviour of small firms and their managers. The survey shows that small-firm 
exits occur not only because of economic difficulties ('Economic-Forced Exit'), but also for 
various other important reasons ('Non-Economic-Forced Exit'). We estimate probit models to 
examine differences between these two exit classes, and it is shown that the probability of 
economic-forced exit is significantly higher if the manager is relatively young, male, if the firm 
has borrowings from a financial institution, and if its sales tend to decrease. It is also shown that 
many managers recommence work as managers or as employees after exit. The proportion of 
managers who work after exit, especially as employees, is higher in the case of economic-forced 
exit than for non-economic-forced exit. These results indicate the potential importance of 
distinguishing between these two types of exits in exit studies. 
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1. Introduction 
 The great majority of Japanese firms are small.1 Of 4.7 million Japanese firms, 4.1 
million are small, and 3.1 million are individual proprietorships (non-primary industry, The 
2001 Establishment and Enterprise Census, the Statistics Bureau, Ministry of Internal Affairs 
and Communications).2 In terms of numbers employed, 7.2 million of 38.3 million regular 
employees work in small firms, and if all other jobs of individual proprietorships are included, 
such as the roles of the proprietors themselves and unpaid family workers, 10.8 million of 42.7 
million people work in small firms. There has been a longstanding fall in the entry rate of new 
firms in Japan, which in fact fell below the exit rate after the 1990s, and these trends have been 
an important economic policy issue for more than a decade. Of the 151,000 entries and 223,000 
exits per year, 105,000 and 154,000 respectively are individual proprietorships.3 Hence, entries 
and exits in Japan can, to a significant extent, be examined in the context of small-firm 
behaviour. 
 It is usually difficult to obtain information on firm exits (especially in cases other than 
bankruptcy) and to conduct post-exit surveys on these firms and the managers. The severity of 
this problem increases for smaller firms, with the result that small-firm exits have not previously 
been studied in detail, particularly in Japan. 
 More detailed information has recently been provided by a large-scale questionnaire 
survey, The Survey on the Retirement of Small Firm Managers, which was carried out in 
November 2003. The survey provides detailed information, including reasons for exits of small 
firms; characteristics of managers and their firms; several categories of economic status of the 
firm's activities before exit; and post-exit working behaviour of the managers. The objective of 
this paper is to investigate small-firm exit behaviour using the results of the survey. Although 
                                                  
1 In this paper, a firm (including individual proprietorships) is defined as 'small' if its regular employees 
are 20 or fewer (in the commerce and service industry, five or fewer), which follows the definition of The 
Small and Medium Enterprise Basic Law in Japan. 
2 More than 95 percent of Japanese individual proprietorships are categorized as small firms. 
3 Non-primary industry, The 2001 Establishment and Enterprise Census. 
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part of the survey result has been analysed in the 2004 White Paper on Small and Medium 
Enterprises in Japan (Small and Medium Enterprise Agency, 2004), the current paper 
principally analyses the part of the survey that was not quoted in that report. We stress the 
importance of recognizing a variety of exits, and differences between them are examined by 
estimating probit models. 
 The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief 
overview of relevant previous literature. Section 3 describes the survey and dataset. Section 4 
analyses exits of small firms and estimates probit models to investigate differences between exit 
categories. Section 5 examines post-exit behaviour of managers. Section 6 reports our 
conclusions. 
 
 
2. Previous Research 
 Previous investigations of firm exits have taken a microeconomic, and industrial 
organization, perspective. The dominant framework presumes that each firm behaves with the 
objective of profit maximization, and exits from market occur when the profit (or 
expected/revealed profit) is below some threshold (Jovanovic, 1982; Ghemawat and Nalebuff, 
1985; Frank, 1988; Klepper, 1996; Das and Das, 1996). Thus, in empirical studies, exits have 
firstly been supposed to be linked with economic variables such as the rate of growth or 
contraction rate of the market, the level or change of the price-cost margin (or other profit 
measures), strength of entry and exit barriers, and firm size (e.g., Mansfield, 1962; Shapiro and 
Khemani, 1987; Austin and Rosenbaum, 1990).4 There are several Japanese studies that follow 
this approach (Kusuda, Yokokura and Negoro, 1979; Morikawa and Tachibanaki, 1997; Honjo, 
1999a; and Doi, 1999). 
 Other research fields are related to exit studies—fields such as bankruptcy, default, 
                                                  
4 One such relationship, that between exit and firm size, has also been studied in the context of Gibrat’s 
Law.  
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survival, duration, business failure, and business closure (Altman, 1968; Audretsch, 1991, 1995; 
Mata and Portugal, 1994; Wagner, 1994; Cressy, 1996; and see also Storey’s [1994] survey). 
These areas are partially overlapping but are, to some extent, independent. Representative 
Japanese studies in these fields include the bankruptcy analysis of Helwege and Packer (2003) 
and the study of business failure by Honjo (2000).5 
 Researchers have also recently studied details of exits, particularly in Europe and the 
United States. Harhoff, Stahl and Woywode (1998), using data for German firms, investigated 
the probability of exits distinguishing insolvency and voluntary liquidation. Taylor (1999) 
studied self-employment duration in the UK by estimating a hazard model, distinguishing 
between involuntary termination and voluntary termination.6 Headd (2003) and Bates (2005) 
stressed the existence of 'successful' closures in addition to 'unsuccessful' closures, using the 
results of the Characteristics of Business Owners (CBO) database in the US. This survey asked 
owners of closed businesses their subjective success status at closure.7 Also for Japan, Honjo’s 
(1999b) exceptional study on new Japanese firms in the software industry estimated a 
multinominal logit model in which 'failure' was defined as exit by bankruptcy, and 'non-failure' 
as other cases of exit (except for merger). The underlying motivation of the present paper is 
considered to be close to these recent research streams. 
 
 
                                                  
5 Studies on failure almost always contain a potential problem relating to the definition of the term 
'failure' (Watson and Everett, 1993; Everett and Watson, 1998). Honjo (2000) defined 'failure' as the 
occurrence of a bankruptcy flag, as determined by Tokyo Shoko Research, Ltd., so his study can be 
considered as a bankruptcy study. 
6 Taylor (1999) defined 'involuntary termination' as exit by bankruptcy, and 'voluntary termination' as exit 
to better or different employment. 
7 Earlier, Schary’s (1991) pioneering work considered the differences between bankruptcy, voluntary 
liquidation, and merger, using data for 61 cotton textile firms in the New England region of the US in 
1924-1940. Further, Kleijweg and Lever (1996) distinguished general exit and exit by bankruptcy for 
Dutch manufacturing establishments, and Winter et al. (2004) treated different reasons for leaving 
business in the US family business sector. 
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3. Data 
 This paper is based on the results of The Survey on the Retirement of Small Firm 
Managers (Shokibo kigyo keieisya no intai ni kansuru jittai cyosa), implemented by the Japan 
Small and Medium Enterprise Corporation (JASMEC; Chusyo Kigyo Sogo Jigyo Dan) in 
November 2003. The survey sample consists of 15,000 persons who had contracted the Small 
Enterprise Mutual Aid System (Shokibo Kigyo Kyosai Seido), and who had subsequently 
received mutual aid money because of 'closure of individual proprietorship' or 'dissolution of 
corporation' in the 2001-2002 fiscal years, or because of 'handover of individual proprietorship 
to spouse or child' in the 2000-2002 fiscal years.8 With regard to the last event, it should be 
noted that cases of handover of individual proprietorship to third persons other than spouse or 
child are included in a 'closure of individual proprietorship'. Of the 15,000 cases sampled, 3,958 
valid responses were received, and response rate was 26.4 percent. 
The Small Enterprise Mutual Aid System is a public mutual aid system, now operated 
by the Organization for Small and Medium Enterprise and Regional Innovation, Japan (SMRJ) 
(when the survey was conducted, it was operated by JASMEC. JASMEC was reorganized to the 
SMRJ on July 1, 2004). The system is designed to provide a public and voluntary-commitment 
funding system of retirement benefit for small-firm managers, mainly in non-primary industry. 
Under this system, contracted members pay monthly premiums (up to 70,000 yen per month), 
and receive mutual aid money according to their accumulated premiums when they meet 
specified conditions, such as closure of individual proprietorships, dissolution of corporation, or 
death of managers. The two most appealing features of the system are, first, that there are 
several considerable tax benefits, such as full deduction of monthly premiums from taxable 
income. Second, the system is fully backed and substantially secured by the Japanese 
government, and its operating cost is fully borne by the government. After its establishment in 
                                                  
8 The 15,000 sample observations are distributed as 10,145, 4,000 and 855, respectively on the 3 payout 
events. Only the last event–'handover of individual proprietorship'–is a full-count survey, while the data 
relating to the other two events are obtained by random sampling. This is because the number of 
occurrences of the last event is small relative to the first two. 
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1965, it now (at the end of the 2003 fiscal year) has about 1.3 million members on contract and 
it has total assets of about 7.7 thousand billion yen.9 
It is difficult to observe small-firm exits and to track their managers. Where firms exit 
without debt (i.e. when the firm is not in bankruptcy) or, in Japan, where firms declare 
bankruptcy with a total debt at bankruptcy of less than ten million yen, it is generally hard for 
third persons even to obtain the simple information that such 'exits' have occurred. For this 
reason, the results of this survey on beneficiaries of the official mutual aid system provide a 
valuable alternative source of hard-to-obtain information. 
 Not all of the 3,958 valid responses were used in the present study. This paper analyses 
data related to two of the three surveyed payout events, namely 'closure of individual 
proprietorship' and 'dissolution of corporation'. Cases of 'handover of individual proprietorship 
to spouse or child' are excluded because they are rather few and, most importantly, these cases 
do not involve firm exits.10 Next, the mutual aid system allows firms to grow after the initial 
date of contract, and some firms larger than the small-firm category are included in the surveyed 
sample. These cases are excluded because of our attempt to focus on the study of small firms.11 
It should also be emphasized that the dataset only includes cases where the firm exits at the 
same time as the manager retires, and so it is not necessary to distinguish between the 
manager’s retirement and firm exit. After also excluding respondents who did not complete all 
questions required in the analysis, the final sample size was 1,743 and it this sample of 
small-firm managers who exited because of the closure of individual proprietorships or 
dissolution of corporations in the 2001-2002 fiscal years which is the basis for the present paper. 
                                                  
9 This number of members represents more than 20 percent of eligible persons in non-primary industry. 
10 The small number of cases of handover of individual proprietorships to third persons other than spouse 
or child that were included in the case of 'closure of individual proprietorship', were excluded based on 
other information provided by survey questions.  
11 That is, we excluded firms whose regular employees exceeded 20 (in the wholesale and retail trade, 
eating and drinking places, and service industry, exceeded 5) at the point that the manager decided to exit. 
However, the results are mostly not affected by whether these cases are included in the analysis. 
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4. Reasons for Exits 
4. 1. Preliminary Analysis 
 Table I (1) presents the results of the question that asked the main reason for exit. In 
the table, the largest category is 'despairing perception for further business' (38 percent), next is 
'aging of the manager' (20 percent) and following is 'illness or injury of the manager' (15 
percent). We can immediately observe that small-firm exits are not only the result of economic 
difficulties (such as despairing situations of the business or bankruptcy), but also occur for a 
variety of other reasons (such as aging or health issues). Further, although less numerous, exits 
also occur in order 'to take life easy' or 'to take new job or start up new business'. We consider 
these various exits for reasons other than economic difficulties to be cases that do not 
necessarily correspond to the central framework of standard exit studies. The small proportion 
of bankruptcies reported in the table (two percent) is possibly a consequence of two features of 
the dataset. First, small firms are less likely to become bankrupt because many of them do not 
borrow from financial institutions and if they do borrow, the amount will tend to be small. 
Second, the sample does not include cases where the manager had withdrawn from the mutual 
aid system before bankruptcy and received some refund of money, even if the firm eventually 
became bankrupt.12 
Table I (2) gives results from a question that asked for more detail from respondents 
who gave 'despairing perception for further business' or 'bankruptcy' as the main reason for 
exit.13 It shows that 71 percent of the total chose 'decline of sales or order', which indicates that 
                                                  
12 One of the other limitations of the dataset is that managers who had not contracted with the mutual aid 
system from the beginning are excluded from the sample.  
13 In Table I (2), we can see that 'no response' cases, i.e., those who answered the question on Table I (1) 
but who did not answer the question on Table I (2), are included in the dataset to be studied. This 
treatment is intended to avoid a bias that would arise if these cases are excluded, because then cases 
corresponding only to 'Non-Economic-Forced Exit' (stated below) would be systematically dropped from 
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shrinkage of sales plays an overwhelming role in these types of exits. Next important, at nine 
percent, is 'having a deficit'. Only three percent chose 'rejection or reduction of loan by financial 
institution', but this may be explained by the same underlying reasons as the low proportion of 
bankruptcy reported in Table I (1). 
 Further, Table I also presents results where the sample has been divided into two 
subgroups by the manager’s age at exit (of under 65 years old, and 65 and over), together with 
results from the total sample. The main reason for this division is that in common statistical 
classifications, people in the 15-64 age group are defined as the 'productive age population', and 
older people fall into the 'aged population'. This implicitly assumes that people under 65 can be 
expected to be 'productive' workers, but that people 65 and over are necessarily not expected to 
work. We consider that it is appropriate to apply this age division to the current dataset. 
Moreover, using this criterion results in a rough balance between the numbers in the two 
sub-groups: persons aged under 65 comprise 56 percent of the total, while the group of 65 and 
over comprise 44 percent. 
 Table I (1) shows that, in the group of 65 and over, the proportion of 'despairing 
perception for further business' or 'bankruptcy' is less (about half, in fact) than in the group of 
under 65, but that the proportion citing managers' aging or health issues is larger for the former 
group. This suggests that distributions of reasons for exits differ by the manager’s age. In turn, 
Table I (2) analyses these groups in more detail, and it shows a relatively similar distribution of 
reasons for exits between the two age groups. This leads to the conclusion that, while there are 
considerable age-group differences in the proportion of exits by reason of economic difficulties, 
there are no clear age-group differences as to the detailed reasons for the economic difficulties 
they experienced. 
 It is useful to classify exits into two main types: exits derived from economic 
difficulties for the business, i.e., 'despairing perception for further business' or 'bankruptcy'; and 
exits for various other reasons. This paper hereafter defines the former as 'Economic-Forced 
                                                                                                                                                  
the sample. 
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Exit' and the latter as 'Non-Economic-Forced Exit', and the main focus is on explaining the 
differences between them. However, Table I (2) shows that, in the case of 'despairing perception 
for further business' or 'bankruptcy', there is a small number of cases where the specified reason 
is 'manager’s aging or health issue'. These cases are separated out and defined as being in the 
group of non-economic-forced exit. 
 As a result, our dataset includes 692 economic-forced exits and 1,051 
non-economic-forced exits, so the latter category accounts for 60 percent of the whole sample 
(summarized in Table II). For the two age groups, it can be observed that in the under 65 group 
the proportions of the two types of exits are about equal, while in the group of 65 and over 
non-economic-forced exits comprise three quarters of the total. 
 Table III provides a more detailed distribution of manager’s age at exit for the total 
sample, and for economic-forced exit and non-economic-forced exit. Of the total exits, 66 
percent are 60 years or older, and 93 percent are 50 years or older. The 60-69 year age group 
accounts for 44 percent of the total, and 50-79 accounts for 90 percent. If the data are 
differentiated by reasons for exit, we observe differences between the shapes of the distributions. 
The peak of the distribution for 'non-economic-forced exit' occurs at a higher age group (65-69) 
than for the other group. Based on comparisons of detailed age distributions in Table III, it is 
also suggested that an age of about 65 years possibly represents a breakpoint in the nature of 
exit behaviour. 
 
4.2. Estimation: Economic-Forced Exits and Non-Economic-Forced Exits 
 Heretofore, we have simply observed distributions of reasons for exits, focusing on the 
relationship between the manager’s age and the difference between economic-forced exits and 
non-economic-forced exits. This section reports estimates of probability models that examine 
differences between two types of exits, simultaneously incorporating and controlling various 
factors other than the manager’s age. To be more specific, we estimate probit models, using as a 
dependent variable a dummy that takes one for economic-forced exit and zero otherwise. 
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Explanatory variables include broad information on managers’ human characteristics, their 
(exited) firm characteristics, and the economic status of the business at the time of exit. The 
object of the estimation is to evaluate empirically the impact of these factors on exit behaviour. 
 The model is formally described as follows: 
 
   Prob (economic-forced exits occur | β,x′ ) = )( βx′Φ , 
 
where )(Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution, x is the 
vector of explanatory variables, and β  is the vector of parameters to be estimated. 
 Four items extracted from the survey are used as explanatory variables describing 
managers’ human characteristics. These are: manager’s age; gender; years of operating the 
business as manager; and whether the manager is the founder of the firm. The manager’s age is 
measured at exit and is defined in the same way as in the previous section. This information is 
firstly included as a continuous variable. Also, considering the possibility of a significant 
discontinuity of exit behaviour by age group as discussed above, it is included in the form of a 
dummy variable which distinguishes under-65 and over-65 age groups. Further, we also 
estimate separate models for each age-group sub-sample. The gender dummy takes the value 
one for female and zero otherwise. The result of the question that asked the number of years the 
respondent had worked as a manager in the firm is entered as a continuous variable. The 
founder dummy takes a value of one when the respondent is a founder of the firm and otherwise 
zero. When the founder dummy takes one, the result of years of operating the business as 
manager conceptually corresponds to the life of the firm. 
Three variables are used to describe the characteristics of (exited) firms. These are the 
organizational form, industrial sector, and the presence or absence of employees. The 
organization-form variable is included as a dummy variable distinguishing a corporate firm 
from an individual proprietorship. The seven industrial sectors are based on the divisions 
included in the survey question, namely, manufacturing, construction, wholesale trade, retail 
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trade, eating and drinking places, services, and 'other'. Finally, the presence or absence of 
employees is a dummy variable which takes a value of one when, in the question regarding the 
number of employees (jyu-gyo-in) at the point that the manager decided to exit, the respondent 
answered the number was zero (i.e., no employees). It takes a zero value if the respondent 
answered that their firm had one or more employees. It might be thought that the number of 
employees could be used as a proxy for firm size, but since this paper studies small firms, the 
possible range of the number of employees is, by definition, limited. Therefore, this paper 
controls only for the presence or absence of employees by including a qualitative variable, 
considering the possible importance of a discontinuity in the nature of exits in the case of no 
employees and one or more employees. In the survey 'employee (jyu-gyo-in)' is defined to 
include paid executive officers and regular employees, but excluding a proprietor and his or her 
family in the same family budget. As a result, it should be noted that a firm which has workers 
sharing the family budget with the proprietor is included in the 'no employee' category. 
 Three factors, derived from the results of the survey, are used to describe the economic 
status of the firm at the point the manager decided to exit. These are whether the firm has 
borrowings from a financial institution, the 'tendency of sales', and 'the profit situation'. The first 
variable is a dummy with unit value if the firm has outstanding borrowings from a financial 
institution, and zero otherwise. The variable of tendency of sales provides information on 
whether sales were rising, stable, or falling in comparison with the same time of the previous 
year. The profit situation dummy depends on whether the ordinary profit recorded a surplus in 
the last period, a deficit in the last period, or consecutive deficits in the last two periods. All 
these 'economic status' variables are necessarily qualitative because of limitations in the design 
of the questionnaire. It is also important to note that each of the questions specifically relates to 
the time at which the manager decided to exit, not at exit. As a result, for example, even where 
there is a time lag between the manager's decision to exit and the actual occurrence of the exit, 
the survey conceptually guarantees that the analysis is based on the time point at which the 
manager made the decision to exit. This is a positive feature of the survey because it allows us 
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to analyse exits based on the business situation at managers' decision points.  
 Table IV presents the sample means of these variables for the total sample and for the 
sub-samples of economic-forced exit and non-economic-forced exit. These do not merely 
express descriptive statistics of explanatory variables for econometric analysis, but also 
illustrate characteristics of this data set. First, in the 'total' sample, the average of the managers’ 
age at exit is 62 years, and 44 percent of them are more than 65 years old. Of these, 22 percent 
are female. In the total sample, managers have operated the business for an average of 26 years, 
which appears rather long. Considering this result together with that for the age of managers, we 
can say that this data set mainly comprises managers of a relatively advanced age who have 
been engaged in management for a rather long term. A large majority (74 percent) of managers 
are founders. In the case of organizational form, about two-thirds are individual proprietorships 
and one third is corporate firms. The 'no employee' case–where only the manager and perhaps 
family members operate the firm–comprises 36 percent of all firms. The most important of the 7 
industry sectors is the manufacturing industry (24 percent), followed by retail trade (19 percent). 
Regarding the economic status of the businesses, only 29 percent of all firms had 
borrowings from a financial institution, which means in parallel that 71 percent engaged in 
business without any borrowings from a financial institution. With regard to sales tendency, 
there are very few cases of increasing sales, with the majority (84 percent) of exiting firms 
reporting decreasing sales, probably the result, at least in part, of the general economic situation 
at that time. Data for the profit situation show that 32 percent of cases were in a surplus in the 
last period, while cases in consecutive deficits in the last two periods are in the majority (51 
percent).  
 Estimation results of probit models are presented in Table V. Cases I and II are both 
results for the total sample, and the difference between them is whether information on the 
manager’s age at exit is applied as a continuous variable in the estimation (case I), or further 
added as the dummy variable distinguishing between under 65 or 65 and over (case II). Cases 
III and IV are the results of estimations with divided samples (under 65 is case III; 65 and over 
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is case IV). Based on the estimated parameters, the table also shows the marginal effects of 
explanatory variables on the probability that the dependent variable takes a value of one. They 
are indices illustrating the degree of impact for each variable, which provides information that 
cannot be obtained from simple or aggregated data observations.14 In these estimations, for 
sales tendency, we only apply a dummy variable which takes a value of one where sales are 
falling, for the practical reason that there are very few instances of rising sales. As a result, the 
cases of 'rising' and 'stable' are not distinguished. 
 Consider first the effect of the manager's age. The table shows a clear tendency that 
the probability of economic-forced exit is significantly higher when the manager is younger, or, 
in other words, the probability of non-economic-forced exit is higher when the manager is older. 
Considering the fact that all managers must retire from business some day, the result seems to 
be convincing. In particular, observing case II, the estimated coefficient of the 65 and over 
dummy is significantly negative and its marginal effect is large (-0.19), so we can conclude that 
there is a noticeable difference between the under 65 and 65 and over groups. Estimation results 
concerning variables other than age are very similar for I and II, and no large differences appear 
even in the sample-divided cases of III and IV. In this sense, we can say that relatively robust 
estimation results are obtained for each factor. 
 We turn now to the results for the other variables related to managers’ human 
characteristics and to firm characteristics. All estimations show that the probability of 
economic-forced exit is significantly higher in the case that the manager is male, and years of 
operating the business are fewer. The marginal effects of the female dummy appear rather large 
(e.g. -0.17, in case II), and in fact its impact is close to the effect of the 65 and over dummy for 
age. In contrast, the founder dummy, the corporation dummy and the no-employee dummy are 
insignificant, which means that clear effects are not presented about these factors. With regard 
                                                  
14 Here, the marginal effects of continuous variables are evaluated at the means of all explanatory 
variables. The marginal effects of dummy variables are evaluated by the differences between the 
probability that the dependent variable takes one when the dummy variable is one minus that probability 
when the dummy variable is zero, at the sample means of all other variables.  
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to the industry-sector variable, in comparison with the manufacturing industry, the estimated 
coefficients for the retail trade industry, eating and drinking places, services, and 'other' are 
significantly negative, and the construction and wholesale trade industries give insignificant but 
negative results. This implies that the manufacturing industry has the highest probability of 
economic-forced exit. The marginal effects of eating and drinking places and services are 
particularly large (respectively -0.25 and -0.19 in case II), indicating remarkable differences 
between these industries and the manufacturing sector. These results possibly indicate the 
substantial relative severity of the business environment of the manufacturing sector. However, 
given that variation of sales tendency and the profit situation are controlled in the estimations, it 
is also possible that these results indicate that the manufacturing sector tends to be more easily 
affected by economic fluctuations than other industries. 
 The results for the effect of the economic status of businesses are common across all 
estimations. The probability of economic-forced exit is significantly higher if the firm had 
borrowings from a financial institution, if its sales tended to decrease, and if negative profit was 
recorded in the last two periods. There is no significant effect of a loss recorded only in the last 
period, by comparison with a surplus in the last period. The results for the borrowing variable 
are possibly related to the freedom of exiting managers to make their own decisions about the 
future of the business. For firms with outstanding loans, it may be that the manager cannot 
unilaterally decide to exit (or remain in business). In the absence of debt, exit decisions seem to 
depend on the manager’s own wishes, and hence exits for the manager’s personal reasons tend 
to be more important in the latter case.15 For the 'tendency of decreasing sales' and 'profit in 
deficits in the last two periods', the marginal effects appear large (in case II, both are about 0.24), 
confirming that these factors are strongly related to economic-forced exit. Conversely, these 
results imply that factors such as the sales tendency or the profit situation exhibit a relatively 
                                                  
15 Alternatively, it might be considered that the manager borrowed to finance the business when the 
business faced an economically difficult situation. However, at all events, the results suggest that 
managers had better seek to avoid borrowing from financial institutions if they value freedom of action in 
relation to exit decisions. 
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small influence on non-economic-forced exit. Hence, the results can also be taken to indicate the 
importance of recognizing a variety of exit behaviours in this area of research.16  
 
 
5. Post-Exit Behaviour of Managers 
 While the firm ceases to exist on the closure of an individual proprietorship or 
dissolution of a corporation, this does not necessarily imply the end of the business career of the 
manager. Under some circumstances, it is possible that the (exited) manager decides to manage 
another business, or to work as an employee in an existing firm. In these cases, we can expect 
that their management experience, their knowledge, and their accumulated skills (some of which 
may be irreplaceable) continue to be used, even after the extinction of the firm. However, it is, 
in general, particularly difficult to track managers’ behaviour after their firms exit. Concerning 
this point, in The Survey on the Retirement of Small Firm Managers, a question is asked 
concerning their current working situation (i.e., one or two years after exit).17 We now 
investigate the post-exit behaviour of managers using this part of the survey. 
Table VI (1) presents results for the total sample, and VI (2) and VI (3) present results 
for the under 65 and 65 and over age groups, respectively. We have retained the same nine 
categories of working status as in the survey question in order to retain as much detailed 
information as possible. These categories can be aggregated into the following three groups: 
'manager' (individual proprietor and executive officer of corporation); 'employed worker' 
(regular employee, part-time employee, temporary employee contracting with a staffing service 
                                                  
16 The focus of this paper is on exiting firms, and it examines the differences between exiting firms. This 
approach is followed because of the limitations of the available data. If possible, it would have been 
desirable to explicitly analyse the choice problem, including other possible outcomes rather than exits, 
such as the firm remaining in business, or being taken over by another person. Such an analysis must be 
left to further research. 
17 To be concrete, respondents are firstly asked whether they are now engaged in working for income or 
not. If they respond as 'working' they are further asked to indicate the kind of work from 9 categories 
shown in Table VI. 
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company, and contract employee); and 'other worker' (assistant for own family business, 
piecework at home, and others). In each table, results are presented for all firms, and for firms 
categorised by the two types of exits and by the status of disposal of liabilities. The 'status of 
disposal of liabilities' is defined in terms of responses to a survey question asking whether there 
are any remaining business liabilities at the time of the survey. Responses to this question 
provide worthwhile information concerning events some time after exit, as does the question 
related to post-exit working status.18 Of the responses, 90 percent indicate complete disposal of 
liabilities at the time of the survey (Table VI [1]).19 
 Results in Table VI (1) show that 44 percent of all managers recommence work after 
exit. Of the 9 divisions, the most important is individual proprietor of 14 percent, and if we 
include cases where they become the executive officer of a corporation, it is observed that 17 
percent of the total re-engage in another business as a manager. The proportion is larger than 
might be expected, particularly considering that managers who exited 'to take new job or start 
up new business' make up only three percent in Table I (1). Of the 'employed worker' category, 
regular employees comprise five percent. After adding non-regular employed workers who are 
part-time employees (including Arubait), temporary employees contracting with a staffing 
service company, and contract employees (including Shokutaku), the proportion of employed 
workers also reaches 17 percent, which is equal to the proportion who recommence work as a 
manager. 
Now we turn to the results for the two age groups in Tables VI (2) and VI (3). The 
proportion of managers working after exit is 59 percent for those under 65 and 24 percent for 
                                                  
18 The question asked about the general situation of 'liabilities concerning the business', and thus the term 
'liability' in the question conceptually corresponds to broad kinds of liabilities including trade creditors 
and borrowings from relatives. In this sense, the content of this question is fundamentally different from 
the question for 'situation of borrowings from financial institution' presented in the earlier section. 
19 In Table VI (1), there are only 1,425 responses to the 'disposal of liabilities' question, compared to the 
total sample size of 1,743. Since information regarding the disposal of liabilities is used only in this 
section and mainly for simple comparative references, the response to this question is not treated as one 
of the necessary conditions for constructing the general dataset. 
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those aged 65 and over, which shows a remarkably large proportion for those under 65. As can 
be expected, there are very few cases of regular employees in the 65 and over age group, while 
in the under 65 group, 9 percent take a work as regular employees. For non-regular employees, 
the proportion of managers working after exit is 18 percent for the under 65 group, but only four 
percent in the 65 and over group. Only 11 percent of the 65 and over group recommence work 
as a manager compared with 23 percent of those under 65. It is possible that the differences in 
employed workers by age group depend at least partly on employers’ decisions, not just on the 
exited manager’s intentions. However, considering that there are large differences in the 
proportions of those recommencing work as a manager, it is inferred that the manager’s age has 
an important effect on the post-exit behaviour, not only on the exit decisions shown in the 
section 4. 
 It is clear that the type of exit influences the post-exit working behaviour of managers. 
For the economic-forced exit group the majority of managers (56 percent) recommence work 
after exit compared to less than 35 percent for the non-economic-forced exit group (Table IV 
[1]). In terms of detailed differences, the most noticeable point is that for economic-forced exit, 
the proportion of exited managers re-employed as employees is higher for each of the four 
categories of employed workers than in the corresponding cases for non-forced exit. While there 
is a difference in the case of regular employees (about 5 percent), the difference for non-regular 
employees is much larger (18 percent for the economic-forced exit; 8 percent for the 
non-economic-forced exit). Therefore, the greatest cause of the difference in the proportion of 
managers working after exit is accounted for by the difference in the proportion working after 
exit as non-regular employees. Analysing the differences by age groups (Tables IV [2] and IV 
[3]), we can see that the differences in the proportions of employed workers are most 
pronounced in the under 65 age group. 
 A natural explanation for the observed difference in post-exit work when categorised 
by type of exit is that, for managers subject to economic-forced exit, taking some work is a 
matter of economic necessity. Of course, it could also be assumed that they desired a shift from 
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a position as firm manager to an employee or even a non-regular employee in some instances. 
However, concerning this point, a comparison of the distribution of working status for the 
economic-forced-exit category with the results for 'disposal of liabilities' in the same table, 
indicates that the distribution for 'economic-forced exit' is similar to the distribution of 
'not-completed'. That is, the proportion of managers working post-exit for the non-completed 
category is much larger than for the other category, and the proportions of individual proprietors 
and non-regular employees are large, as these types of work seem to be relatively easy to start or 
undertake. This result can be taken to indicate that, where the disposal of liabilities is 
incomplete, the managers tend to need to work after exit to repay liabilities. We infer that the 
similarity of the distributions between these two events implies that a greater proportion of the 
managers in economic-forced exits must take work after exit by reason of economic necessity 
than would be the case where there was a voluntary decision to exit and the manager shifted to 
become an employed worker.20 
 
 
6. Concluding Remarks 
 About nine out of ten Japanese firms are small firms, and two thirds are individual 
proprietorships. Issues related to entries and exits in Japan are also, therefore, largely issues 
relating to small firms. Exits of small firms have not yet been sufficiently studied, particularly in 
Japan, partly because of the problem of availability of data. Under such circumstances, this 
paper aimed to examine small-firm exit behaviour, using the results from The Survey on the 
Retirement of Small Firm Managers conducted in November 2003. 
 The survey results show that small-firm exits were not only directly caused by 
economic difficulties for business ('Economic-Forced Exit') but also, and importantly, by a 
                                                  
20 Of the 148 cases where disposal of liabilities are 'not-completed', 84 are involved in economic-forced 
exit and 64 are involved in non-economic-forced exit. Therefore, the similarity of the distribution of 
working status between not-completed disposal of liabilities and economic-forced exit does not result 
directly from the high similarity of the samples. 
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variety of factors, such as aging or health issues. Further, although not observed so frequently, a 
number of exits occurred in order 'to take life easy' or 'to take new job or start up new business'. 
These various exits for reasons other than economic difficulties ('Non-Economic-Forced Exit') 
seem not to correspond to the central framework of standard exit studies and they occupy a 
majority (60 percent) in this dataset. We estimated probit models to further examine the reasons 
for exit. The estimation results showed that the probability of economic-forced exit was 
significantly higher if the manager was a relatively young male, if the firm had borrowings from 
a financial institution, and if its sales tended to decrease. Taking advantage of the dataset, this 
paper then investigated the post-exit working behaviour of managers, which has previously been 
difficult to track. The results indicate that a rather large proportion of managers recommence 
work as managers or as employed workers after exit, and that the proportion of those who do so, 
especially as employed workers, was higher in the case of economic-forced exits. These results 
indicate the potential importance of distinguishing clearly between these two types of exits in 
exit studies. 
 The Japanese population is aging very rapidly. Firm managers, many of whom are 
with small firms that were established before the beginning of the 1970s' high-growth period in 
Japan, are also aging. These firms are destined to exit in the not-so-distant future unless the firm 
or management is taken over by someone, regardless of whether the business succeeds or not. 
Of course, where the business is completely personal and inseparable from the manager, there is 
inarguably no choice other than to exit. In addition, it can be supposed that the exit of firms that 
have no further role in the economy leads to a gradual rise in the productivity of the whole 
economy (c.f. Nishimura, Nakajima, and Kiyota, 2005). Therefore, it is obviously misleading to 
advocate the avoidance of all business closures. Even so, at the individual level, the question of 
how the managers of exiting firms draw a curtain on their business, and whether it is suitable for 
the role that they had played, should be given due attention as another important issue. Above 
all, such an analysis will contribute to fostering the constructing of a ‘healthy’ potential 
entrepreneurship cluster to lead the next generation. We hope this research also makes a 
 20
contribution to this important issue. 
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(1) Main Reason for Exit
　 Items under 65 65 and over
1 To take life easy 3.1 3.3 2.9
2 To take new job or start up new business 3.1 4.9 0.8
3 Aging of the manager 20.0 5.4 38.7
4 Aging of employee 0.8 0.4 1.2
5 Illness or injury of the manager 14.5 13.0 16.4
6 Illness or injury of manager's relatives 2.7 2.4 3.1
7 Family issues including marriage or removal (except for 6) 0.9 1.4 0.1
8 Disaster (except for 5-7） 0.3 0.4 0.1
9 Diminished motivation for the business 6.9 8.6 4.7
10 Despairing perception for further business (except for 3-8) 37.9 49.2 23.4
11 Bankruptcy 2.3 2.8 1.7
12 Others 7.6 8.3 6.8
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 1743 979 764
(Percent, Number)
(2) Specified Reason for 'Despairing Perception for Further Business' or 'Bankruptcy'
(Relevant to 10 or 11 in Table 1(1))
　 Items under 65 65 and over
1 Decline of sales or order 70.5 71.1 68.8
2 Bankruptcy of client company 4.4 4.1 5.2
3 Bankruptcy of supplier 1.1 1.6         -
4 Having a deficit 9.1 8.1 12.0
5 Rejection or reduction of loan by financial institution 2.6 2.4 3.1
6 Manager's aging or health issue 1.3 1.4 1.0
7 Retirement of employee 0.1 0.2         -
8 Others 5.4 5.1 6.3
No response 5.4 6.1 3.6
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 701 509 192
(Percent, Number)
TABLE I
By Manager's Age at
Exit
By Manager's Age at
ExitTotal
Total
Reasons for Exits of Small Firms
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under 65 65 and over
Economic-forced exit 39.7 51.3 24.9
Non-economic-forced exit 60.3 48.7 75.1
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 1743 979 764
(Percent, Number)
 Notes) Economic-forced exit is defined as 10 or 11 in Table 1(1) 
             (except for 6 in Table 1(2))
             Non-economic-forced exit is defined as other than 10 or 11
             in Table1(1), and 6 in Table 1(2)
Economic-Forced Exit and Non-Economic-Forced Exit
By Manager's Age at ExitTotal
TABLE II
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Age Group Total
Economic-
Forced Exit
Non-Economic-
Forced Exit
25-39 1.7 1.2 2.1
40-49 5.8 8.8 3.8
50-54 11.5 14.2 9.8
55-59 15.4 22.1 10.9
60-64 21.7 26.3 18.7
65-69 22.3 17.9 25.1
70-74 12.9 6.6 17.0
75-79 6.0 2.5 8.4
80-93 2.6 0.4 4.1
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 1743 692 1051
(Percent, Number)
Distribution of Manager's Age
Manager's Age at Exit
TABLE III
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Manager's Age 62.39 59.53 64.28
65 and over 0.438 0.275 0.546
Gender (female=1) 0.215 0.165 0.247
Years of Operating  as Manager 26.37 23.44 28.30
Founder 0.737 0.711 0.754
Corporate Firm 0.355 0.442 0.298
No Employee 0.362 0.328 0.384
Manufacturing 0.235 0.301 0.192
Construction 0.141 0.169 0.123
Wholesale Trade 0.057 0.077 0.045
Retail Trade 0.189 0.176 0.198
Eating and Drinking Places 0.068 0.038 0.088
Services 0.130 0.092 0.155
Others 0.178 0.147 0.199
Having Borrowings from Financial Institution 0.289 0.403 0.213
Sales Increasing 0.015 0.001 0.025
Sales Stable 0.145 0.059 0.201
Sales Decreasing 0.840 0.939 0.775
Surplus in the Last Period 0.316 0.173 0.409
Loss in the Last Period 0.174 0.130 0.204
Loss in the Last Two-Periods 0.510 0.697 0.387
n 1743 692 1051
TABLE IV
Means of Variables
Total Economic-
Forced Exits
Non-Economic-
Forced Exits
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Dependent variable: Economic-forced exit=1, Non-economic-forced exit=0
coefficient t-value
marginal
effect coefficient t-value
marginal
effect coefficient t-value
marginal
effect coefficient t-value
marginal
effect
constant 1.4956 5.29 ** 0.4567 1.31 -0.3570 -0.87 2.4189 2.54 * 　
Manager's Age -0.0334 -7.34 ** -0.0125 -0.0127 -2.08 * -0.0048 -0.0016 -0.21 -0.0006 -0.0422 -3.16 ** -0.0112
65 and over - -0.5259 -5.03 ** -0.1929 - -
Gender (female=1) -0.4570 -5.20 ** -0.1614 -0.4876 -5.51 ** -0.1711 -0.4432 -4.31 ** -0.1748 -0.4896 -2.70 ** -0.1097
Years of Operating as Manager -0.0160 -4.36 ** -0.0060 -0.0154 -4.16 ** -0.0058 -0.0157 -3.04 ** -0.0063 -0.0174 -3.09 ** -0.0046
Founder -0.0535 -0.68 -0.0201 -0.0615 -0.78 -0.0232 0.0233 0.23 0.0093 -0.2342 -1.78 -0.0655
Corporate Firm 0.0137 0.17 0.0051 -0.0211 -0.27 -0.0079 -0.0114 -0.12 -0.0046 -0.1227 -0.88 -0.0318
No Employee -0.0354 -0.47 -0.0133 -0.0251 -0.33 -0.0094 0.1247 1.29 0.0497 -0.2408 -1.89 -0.0625
Manufacturing - - - -
Construction -0.1255 -1.15 -0.0463 -0.1482 -1.35 -0.0544 -0.0281 -0.20 -0.0112 -0.4096 -2.16 * -0.0931
Wholesale Trade -0.1287 -0.86 -0.0472 -0.0901 -0.60 -0.0333 -0.2246 -1.08 -0.0891 -0.0457 -0.21 -0.0119
Retail Trade -0.2886 -2.81 ** -0.1043 -0.3067 -2.97 ** -0.1103 -0.3560 -2.60 ** -0.1407 -0.2758 -1.74 -0.0676
Eating and Drinking Places -0.8102 -5.17 ** -0.2496 -0.8312 -5.24 ** -0.2538 -0.7573 -4.10 ** -0.2828 -1.0644 -3.09 ** -0.1704
Services -0.5392 -4.42 ** -0.1835 -0.5522 -4.49 ** -0.1870 -0.4137 -2.75 ** -0.1625 -0.9002 -3.73 ** -0.1678
Others -0.2818 -2.59 ** -0.1018 -0.2733 -2.50 * -0.0987 -0.1175 -0.81 -0.0468 -0.4613 -2.67 ** -0.1076
Having Borrowings from Financial Institution 0.3631 4.80 ** 0.1389 0.3498 4.60 ** 0.1336 0.3895 4.06 ** 0.1539 0.3147 2.41 * 0.0899
Sales Increasing or Stable - - - -
Sales Decreasing 0.7411 6.50 ** 0.2432 0.7125 6.24 ** 0.2349 0.8121 6.02 ** 0.3059 0.4915 2.20 * 0.1103
Surplus in the Last Period - - - -
Loss in the Last Period 0.0641 0.61 0.0242 0.0636 0.60 0.0240 0.0344 0.26 0.0137 0.1213 0.61 0.0333
Loss in the Last Two-Periods 0.6368 7.35 ** 0.2350 0.6654 7.61 ** 0.2449 0.5169 4.76 ** 0.2039 0.9209 5.83 ** 0.2438
Log likelihood -942.3 -929.6 -578.0 -334.6
McFadden R2 0.1952 0.2061 0.1478 0.2192
n 1743 1743 979 764
 Notes) * significant at 5 precent level, ** significant at 1 percent level
[III] under 65 [IV] 65 and over
TABLE V
[II] Total[I] Total
Probit Estimates
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(1) Total
　
Completed
Not
Completed
1 Working for income 43.6 56.1 35.4 42.1 66.9
Individual proprietor 13.5 16.8 11.4 13.0 22.3
Executive officer of corporation 3.8 3.8 3.9 4.2 4.1
Regular employee 5.2 8.7 2.9 5.3 6.1
Part-time employee (including Arubait ) 7.2 11.0 4.7 7.2 10.1
Temporary employee contracting with
    staffing service company
Contract employee (including Shokutaku ) 4.1 5.9 2.9 3.8 7.4
Assistant for own family business 3.7 3.6 3.7 2.5 10.1
Piecework at home (Naishoku ) 1.3 1.9 0.9 0.9 2.0
Others 4.1 3.3 4.6 4.4 4.1
2 Not working for income 56.4 43.9 64.6 57.9 33.1
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 1743 692 1051 1277 148
(Percent, Number)
(2) under 65
　
Completed
Not
Completed
1 Working for income 58.9 65.5 52.0 56.5 72.0
Individual proprietor 17.6 18.7 16.4 17.5 18.7
Executive officer of corporation 5.1 3.8 6.5 5.6 3.7
Regular employee 8.8 12.0 5.5 8.8 8.4
Part-time employee (including Arubait ) 11.0 13.7 8.2 10.7 13.1
Temporary employee contracting with
    staffing service company
Contract employee (including Shokutaku ) 6.2 7.6 4.8 5.6 9.3
Assistant for own family business 4.8 4.4 5.2 3.4 10.3
Piecework at home (Naishoku ) 0.8 1.2 0.4 0.1 2.8
Others 3.5 2.8 4.2 3.6 4.7
2 Not working for income 41.1 34.5 48.0 43.5 28.0
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 979 502 477 727 107
(Percent, Number)
(3) 65 and over
　
Completed
Not
Completed
1 Working for income 24.0 31.1 21.6 22.9 53.7
Individual proprietor 8.5 11.6 7.3 7.1 31.7
Executive officer of corporation 2.1 3.7 1.7 2.4 4.9
Regular employee 0.7            - 0.9 0.7          -
Part-time employee (including Arubait ) 2.3 3.7 1.7 2.5 2.4
Temporary employee contracting with
    staffing service company
Contract employee (including Shokutaku ) 1.5 1.6 1.4 1.5 2.4
Assistant for own family business 2.3 1.6 2.4 1.3 9.8
Piecework at home (Naishoku ) 1.7 3.7 1.2 1.8          -
Others 4.9 4.7 4.9 5.5 2.4
2 Not working for income 76.0 68.9 78.4 77.1 46.3
Sum 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
n 764 190 574 550 41
(Percent, Number)
Disposal of Liabilities
TABLE VI
Items
Total Economic-
Forced Exit
Non-
Economic-
Forced Exit
Post-Exit Behaviour of Managers
Items
Total
Disposal of Liabilities
Items
Total
Disposal of Liabilities
Economic-
Forced Exit
Non-
Economic-
Forced Exit
Economic-
Forced Exit
Non-
Economic-
Forced Exit
0.9
0.1 0.5            - 0.2          -
1.1 1.4 0.8 1.1
0.70.7 1.2 0.4 0.7
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